



A Literature Review of Emerging Donors and 
the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance
Abstract
In this paper, we look at the scale and scope of emerging donors, many of which are developing 
economies themselves. On the basis of a survey of the literature, we find that estimates of annual 
aid flows from new donors (so-called non-DAC donors) vary greatly and are somewhere between 
$11 billion and $41.7 billion, or 8 and 31 percent of global gross ODA. We find that new donors are 
not a monolithic group but instead represent three distinct models of aid delivery, which we describe 
as the DAC Model, the Arab Model and the Southern Model.
While we see the need to increase transparency and accountability of aid flows across these delivery 
models, we do not see a convergence to the DAC model. Rather, emerging donors may follow 
different paths, in accordance with their own traditions and standards. We argue that encouraging 
aid transparency, especially reporting data on project-level assistance, must be the core focus of the 
aid community. To engage the non-DAC donors, the forum for international aid coordination might 
need to be moved away from the OECD-DAC platform; DAC could instead serve as one donor 
caucus within a larger international system of aid reporting.
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“What we have here – in states like China, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, and Venezuela – are regimes that…collectively 
represent a threat to healthy, sustainable development. 
Worse, they are effectively pricing responsible and well-
meaning aid organizations out of the market in the very 
places where they are needed the most. If they continue to 
succeed in pushing their alternative development model, 
they will succeed in underwriting a world that is more 
corrupt, chaotic, and authoritarian.” -- Moises Naim, editor 
in chief, Foreign Policy, 2007 
“[The DAC] should welcome, not discourage, a greater 
role by donors outside DAC. It is entirely logical that we 
move from a world dominated by North-South flows of 
aid to a much more multi-polar approach where the web 
of co-operation links countries of every sort. The DAC 
should not aspire to be a donors’ cartel. Greater choice for 
developing countries is in principle good.” – Richard 
Manning, chair of the OECD DAC, 2006 
Emerging donors comprise growing nations with strong economies that are increasing their 
international footprint through many channels, including foreign assistance. Poverty levels 
remain high within many of these countries, stirring a debate about whether resources would 
be better spent by focusing on the poor at home, rather than half a world away. 
Furthermore, there are fears about the impact on the standard donor-recipient aid structure. 
Traditional donors that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) worry that emerging 
donors might support “rogue states,” increase levels of indebtedness, ignore environmental 
protections, focus on extracting resources, and undermine the improvements that have been 
made over the past several decades. With limited data, much is still unknown about these 
players. Some, such as Arab donors, report their Official Development Assistance (ODA) to 
the OECD-DAC although they are not members. Others, including the BRICs, do not 
follow the DAC’s reporting standards. Figure 1 shows estimates of ODA, from emerging 
and traditional donors. 
Overall estimations for the non-DAC donors range from $11 billion to $41.7 billion –
between 8 and 31 percent of global gross ODA. In terms of both gross ODA (Figure 1) and 
ODA as a percent of Gross National Income (GNI) (Figure 2), the range of estimations has 
a dramatic effect on how the non-DAC countries line up in relation to the DAC donors. If 
upper estimates are to be believed, China, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia give more ODA than half 
of the DAC donors. Four non-DAC donors (Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), and China) reach the UN target of 0.7% of GNI; a benchmark that 18 of 
the 23 DAC member countries do not reach. Lower estimates are less dramatic, yet still 
represent a remarkable (and growing) contribution. China’s aid estimates range anywhere  
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from $1.5 to $25 billion; if the upper estimate is accurate, it ranks as the second largest 
donor after the United States.1 
Figure 1: Gross ODA ($ Billions)
Note: Excludes Japan, France, Germany, United Kingdom due to scaling of graph. Lines 
connect high and low estimates. 
Figure 2: ODA as a Percent of GNI 
Note: Lines connect high and low estimates. 
                                                       
1 Analysis from Brautigam and Lancaster, among others, estimates that China’s foreign assistance ranges 
from $1.5 billion to $2 billion. The high estimate is from a NYU Wagner School Study and reported by Lum et 
al. There are disagreements on whether some Chinese economic activities should be classified as foreign 










In this paper, we will lay out key trends and themes for emerging donors. We argue that 
South-South cooperation has existed for the same amount of time as North-South donor-
recipient relationships. But modalities differ dramatically—in fact, researchers observe three 
separate models of aid, only one of which is structured after the current OECD-DAC 
structure. Due to these different modes of providing assistance, transparency in data 
reporting is a real challenge; we cannot expect to improve international cooperation unless 
we understand how much is being spent and where it is going. We conclude with a 
discussion of the relevance of the DAC, positing that future collaboration between emerging 
and traditional donors might depend on significant changes to existing structures of global 
governance and on different types of fora for international aid coordination.  
Emergence or Re-emergence? 
Despite popular terminology, most of the so-called emerging donors are not new to giving 
aid.2 The history of official economic cooperation and mutual support for many of these 
states can be traced back to the 1950s. The 1955 Bandung Conference of Asian and African 
States was a significant milestone in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, the official 
beginning of a collective voice for the South. The Final Communiqué from Bandung 
specifically laid out the desire for economic cooperation and growth, along with an 
agreement to provide technical assistance to one another, thus facilitating the exchange of 
ideas, experts, and specific training. It suggested that educational, scientific and technical 
institutions should admit and train students and experts from other countries. It also noted 
the importance of trans-national infrastructure, proposing that studies and collective action 
should be focused on improving shipping lines, and it recommended the creation of national 
and regional banks and insurance companies. The 29 participants in this conference laid the 
foundation for the approaches to South-South development cooperation that we see today. 3 
The themes of technical cooperation and infrastructure construction remain relevant half a 
century later. It is worth noting that the motivation for cooperation and technical assistance 
was not a moral obligation. Rather, it was founded upon a desire for mutual cooperation and 
development – before any of these countries had achieved major economic success.  
In the decades that followed there was an emergence of aid programs to support the 
economic cooperation espoused by the Bandung Conference. Arab donors have some of the 
oldest and most established national aid agencies. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development was established in 1961 (for a point of comparison, that is also the year that 
the United States Agency for International Development, USAID, was founded), and 
                                                       
2 One of the most recent emerging donors is South Africa, whose aid program was started during the 
Apartheid era.  
3 Hosted by Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Participants included Afghanistan, Cambodia, 
Peoples Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
the State of Vietnam, and Yemen.  
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broadened to include assistance to all countries in 1974. The UAE established the Abu 
Dhabi Fund for Development in 1971. The Saudi Fund for Development was created in 
1974. The region also pioneered the establishment of regional financial institutions – five 
such institutions for international development were established between 1971 and 1976. 
Arab aid has historically fluctuated, with aid amounts closely following oil prices. Countries 
are, on average, quite generous -- the average net aid for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE 
between 1973 and 2008 was 1.5% of GNI. It reached as high as 12% of GNI for the UAE 
during the 1970s and early 1980s.4 This is exceedingly generous in comparison with the 
OECD DAC members whose aid generally falls below 0.2% of GNI. Between 1974 and 
1994 Arab aid accounted for approximately 13.5% of the world’s ODA.5  
Figure 3: Arab ODA as a ratio of DAC ODA
 
Arab nations were by no means alone. India began small regional projects in the 1950s, and 
established the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation in 1964 as a flagship program 
to focus on training and technical assistance. China’s aid program began in an ad-hoc fashion 
in the 1950s with the transfer of grain, medicine, and cotton to North Korea and soon to 
countries along its border. In 1963 it expanded to Africa and completed some high-profile 
projects, notably the Tazara railway between Tanzania and Zambia. During the Cold War, 
China was giving aid to 30 African nations, and giving more than the Soviet Union in all 
African countries, except eight strategic Soviet allies. In the following decades, China has 
given aid to every African nation, save Swaziland, which continues to align with Taiwan.6 
Aid between Southern countries declined dramatically during the 1980s as most states were 
coping with high levels of debt, inflation, and OPEC countries were more constrained. The 
debt crisis forced countries to turn their attention inwards and thus significantly reduced 
South-South cooperation. OECD countries began to dominate as aid donors, representing 
over 95 percent of all international aid flows in the 1990s.7 However, by the end of the 
                                                       
4 “Arab Development Assistance,” xiii. 
5 Woods, 2. 
6 Brautigam, 2, 34. 












1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
Arab aid
DAC
Source: Table A2-1, "Arab Foreign Assistance," World Bank, June 2010  
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decade, a Southern presence re-emerged. Dramatic economic growth in many “third world” 
countries proved a model for successful development that was not dependent on the West. 
Regional powers sought to increase their influence with neighboring countries, and South-
South cooperation proved a way to lobby for more leverage in the international arena. 
Increasing involvement, especially from big players such as China, drew the world’s attention 
as traditional donors sensed a competing model of involvement and foreign assistance.8  
Overall, the pattern that we see is not a sudden emergence of the non-DAC aid partners. As 
Richard Manning argues, the nearly absolute dominance of the DAC in the 1990s was an 
exceptional time; the historical norm actually includes a high share of non-DAC aid.9 The 
DAC is thus accustomed to aid coming from a variety of sources. But it is not, however, 
accustomed to dealing with such large increases in inflows from countries that still have 
significant levels of poverty within their own borders, countries that are often also recipients 
of DAC assistance. This trend raises questions about whether or not traditional donors 
should still channel significant amounts of aid to countries such as India, Brazil, and South 
Africa. Emerging donors have also garnered significant attention in recent years due to their 
growing role in the global economy as a whole; concern about their aid programs is another 
manifestation of the broader challenge they pose to the status quo of an OECD-dominated 
world.  
Measuring New Aid Flows 
One of the largest challenges in studying the non-DAC donors is quantifying how much aid 
they give. A handful of countries are not members of the DAC, yet do report aid flows to 
the OECD, including members of the EU and the main Arab donors.10 However, the 
reported levels of ODA to the DAC may not capture all aid flows, especially for Arab 
donors. For instance, the AidData Initiative reports higher levels of aid and more projects 
than the DAC database for Arab members of the Coordination Group.11 The Arab 
Monetary Fund publishes the Joint Arab Economic Report as another source of aid data, yet 
is inconsistent and available only in Arabic.12 Although Arab multinationals document aid 
activities well, bilateral donors have been less transparent. Arab countries do not report 
some flows such as debt forgiveness that the traditional DAC donors consider to be ODA. 
Several countries, the UAE in particular, have been found to be inconsistent in their annual 
                                                       
8 Poverty in Focus (article by Michelle Morais de Sa e Silva), 4. 
9 Manning, 371. 
10 These countries are: Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Kuwait, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Thailand, 
Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. (Source: OECD DAC http://bit.ly/hPKuhg) 
11 The AidData Initiative is a relatively new database created by Development Gateway, Brigham Young 
University, and the College of William and Mary. Source: Shushan and Marcouz, 1971. 
12 Source: http://www.arabmonetaryfund.org/ar/jointrep  
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reporting with gaps for several years. 13 Thus, it is safe to assume there are still a significant 
amount of flows that go unreported to the DAC. 
There is also a conspicuous lack of clear data from some of the largest and most rapidly 
evolving aid donors such as China, India, and Brazil. Many countries have no standard 
system for reporting ODA, or even definitions of what qualifies as development assistance. 
For some, such as China, this is a politically sensitive semantic debate – the national policy 
maintains the country gives “external assistance;” but refuses to term it “aid.”14 The DAC 
provides one set of criteria for ODA that is not adopted by many others.15 DAC defines 
ODA as a concessional transaction; a minimum of 25 percent must be a grant (calculated for 
loans at a 10 percent reference rate).16 Boundaries between ODA and Other Official Flows 
(OOF) are drawn through the “gray areas” such as military aid, peacekeeping contributions, 
debt relief, and foreign direct investment. These definitions are not followed by non-DAC 
donors; thus even official estimates may not measure the same financial flows as DAC’s 
ODA.17 This further complicates quantitative analysis between donors because it is almost 
impossible to compare the same pools of money between the DAC and non-DAC donors. 
It is also one of the reasons for the extreme differences in estimations of non-DAC donor 
aid flows; the $25 billion estimate for China may include flows of money that more closely 
resemble foreign direct investment (FDI).  
The literature contains varying estimates on aid flows from emerging donors. There is little 
consistency, which highlights the need for increased transparency from the donor countries 
themselves. We found that total estimates of aid from non-DAC donors in 2009 (or most 
recent year available) range from $11 billion to $41.7 billion. Put another way; non-DAC 
donors give somewhere between eight and thirty-one percent of the global gross ODA from DAC donors.18 
Broken down by country, the highest and lowest estimates in recent literature are shown in 
Table 1. For a point of comparison, we show the amount of aid these countries still receive 
from traditional donors and multilateral institutions. Many countries receive as much, or 
more, than they give. 
   
                                                       
13 Shushan and Marcoux, 1971-2. 
14 Recently, China has relaxed this stance, most noticeably with the publication of the official White Paper 
on China’s Foreign Aid. (Source: Grimm, Aug 2011). 
15 Whether or not the DAC definition accurately captures the “right” financial flows between donors and 
recipients and whether it is an effective measure of development spending are open questions. There are several 
types of financial linkages between countries; which flows may actually contribute to the reduction of poverty 
remains debatable. 
16 “Is it ODA?” DAC Factsheet, November 2008. 
17 “Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum” (ECOSOC), 3-6. 
18 Gross ODA for DAC donors in 2009 was $133.2 billion.  
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Table 1: Estimates of Foreign Aid as a Donor and Recipient, 2009 (or most recent 
year)19 
 
Outflows of Aid  Inflows of Aid* 
 
US$ (Millions)  % of GNI** 
US$ 










                        
Brazil  356  4,000  0.03  0.30  338  0.03 
China  1,500  25,098  0.04  0.71  1,132  0.03 
India  488  2,171  0.04  0.16  2,502  0.18 
South 
Africa  109  475  0.04  0.17  1,075  0.39 
Venezuela  1,166  2,500  0.51  1.09  67  0.03 
Turkey  707  0.12  1,362  0.22 
Russia  785  0.07 
    Saudi 
Arabia  3,134  0.82 
    Kuwait  221  0.14 
    UAE  834  0.80 
    Non-DAC 
EU  1,140 
        Other  636 
        Total  11,076  40,994 
         
                                                       
19 Donors that are listed give over $100M per year. There are several other smaller emerging donors such as 
Argentina (between $5 and $10 Million) and Chile (between $3 and $3.3 Million), among others.  
* ODA Total, net disbursements from all donors and multilaterals. Source: OECD DAC CRS database. All 
for 2009. Data extracted October 6, 2011. 
** Author's calculations based on GNI data from the World Development Indicators Database. GNI for 
year that country aid is reported, with the exception of UAE (GNI data is from 2004).  
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Sources for Table 1: Brazil: Lower Bound: ECOSOC, 2008. Data year 2007. Excludes humanitarian 
assistance and peacekeeping operations. Upper Bound: Estimate from "The Economist," Feb 7, 2011. Includes 
loans. China: Lower Bound: Lancaster, 2007. Data year 2007. Upper Bound: Lum et al, 2009 based on NYU 
Wagner School study. Data year 2007. Of this, 66% was provided in the form of loans (concessional lines of 
credit). This study may also include activities that more closely resemble FDI. Much of this study was based on 
reported offers or pledges and the CRS report cautions that some values may be inflated if pledges have not been 
fulfilled. However, other values may be undervalued, for instance when Chinese materials and labor are not 
reported. India: Lower bound: Zimmermann and Smith, 2011. Data year 2009/10. Upper Bound: Chanana, 2010. 
Data year 2009. Includes grants and loans, contributions to IOs, Investments in IFIs, and EXIM bank. South 
Africa: Lower Bound: Zimmermann and Smith, 2011. Data year 2009/10. Upper Bound: Braude et al, 2008. Data 
year 2006. Venezuela: Source for both: ECOSOC, 2008. Data year 2007. Russia: Source: Zimmermann and 
Smith, 2011. Data year 2009. Estimate from Russian Ministry of Finance. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Turkey: 
Source: OECD/DAC - Table 33 ODA from Non-DAC Donors. Data year 2009. Non-DAC EU: Source: 
OECD. Data year 2009. EU members not part of DAC yet report ODA include Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. Other: Source: OECD. 
Data year 2009. Countries not part of DAC yet report ODA include Iceland, Israel, Liechtenstein, Chinese 
Taipei, Thailand.  
Three Distinct Models 
At the turn of the century traditional aid donors pledged to reform the aid architecture, 
creating the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, followed by the Accra Agenda 
for Action in 2008. They promised a revised aid system, with commitments to improve 
ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability. It became the 
foundation for the OECD-DAC approach to foreign assistance. However, participants in 
the 2005 Paris forum were not only members of the DAC. Ninety-one countries attended, 
including non-traditional heavy weights such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Brazil, South Africa, 
Thailand, Turkey, and China.20 India is the only notable large Southern donor missing from 
the original agreement, however they signed on in 2006.21 Yet, China, India, and many other 
Southern donors, were most likely considering themselves as recipients of aid, rather than as 
donors.22 Although both DAC and non-DAC donors are all signatories to the same 
declaration, and support overarching global development as embodied through the 
Millennium Development Goals, there is a great deal of variance. It is probably fair to say 
that most of the DAC donors have made little progress toward actually implementing the 
commitments made in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda, let alone progress from non-
DAC donors.23  
The DAC donors as a group are certainly not homogenous and there is a large degree of 
variation in terms of aid levels, modalities, and characteristics. Aid as a percentage of GDP 
ranges from 1.1 percent in Sweden to 0.09 percent for South Korea. According to one 
                                                       
20 “The Paris Declaration on aid Effectiveness,” 12. 
21 Sharma, Shantanu Nandan. 
22 Brautigam, 133. 
23 The 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration shows that only one of thirteen targets set for 2010 
has been met. http://www.oecd.org/document/44/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_43385196_1_1_1_1,00.html   
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calculation, Ireland gives no tied or partially tied aid, whereas Austria ties 49 percent of its 
aid.24 Despite these differences, the DAC is a useful categorization of donors because in 
principle, members ascribe to the same standards, they largely have the same concepts of 
what qualifies as development assistance, and they are increasingly willing to partner with 
each other. Aid from the DAC countries has also changed over time, from an early focus on 
infrastructure-based projects to periods of emphasis on policy conditionality. It is not a static 
or homogenous body, yet it is often characterized as such. 
The notion of emerging donors is relatively misleading, as it lumps very distinct groups of 
non-DAC donors into one. Several studies have classified these non-DAC countries into 
various groups based on the modalities and characteristics of their aid programs as well as 
their role in the global political economy. Richard Manning (2006) identified four: OECD 
members not part of the DAC, EU members not part of the OECD, Middle East and 
OPEC countries, and “the others” that don’t fall into the above three categories. 
Zimmermann and Smith (2011) divide them into three groups: Emerging donors, South-
South Cooperation, and Arab donors. We base our analysis on the classification identified in 
Zimmermann and Smith, arguing that their classification also represents three quite distinct 
models of foreign assistance: the DAC model, the Arab model, and the Southern model. 
Although there is some overlap between models, the fundamental philosophies and 
intentions behind aid programs are distinct.  
Just like within the DAC, there is a large amount of variation within these models; countries 
grouped together are certainly not identical. Until there is comprehensive, project level data 
for these countries, it will be almost impossible to do the kind of quantitative assessment 
that is sorely needed.25 The value of typology, however, is that is provides a lens with which 
to view further cooperation. Although both considered emerging donors, China and the 
Czech Republic pose dramatically different challenges for cooperation with the DAC donors 
                                                       
24 2011 Commitment to Development Index: www.cgdev.org/cdi  
25 A recent paper by Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele did one of the first quantitative 
studies of non-DAC donors, using project level data from the AidData Initiative. They find that, on average, new 
donors are less responsive to recipient need, as measured by per-capita income, malnutrition, and child mortality. 
They find that new donors give aid despite high levels of corruption or undemocratic tendencies, yet do not 
perform much worse on this standard than traditional donors. The study is constrained by the project level data 
which is not necessarily comprehensive for all countries. They also lack data on some of the main non-DAC 
players - namely China, India, and Venezuela. The authors group all non-DAC donors together in their main 
analysis. We argue that the trends demonstrated by Brazil and Colombia are very different from those in Latvia 
and Poland or those in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. By lumping such diverse groups of donors, they may be 
masking other trends among the non-DAC donors. The authors do recognize this weakness and run tests to look 
at groups of individual donors divided by region. On the whole, the study is an important contribution to the 
literature on emerging donors. Another recent empirical study by Nkunde Mwase examines the determinants of 
BRIC loans to Low Income Countries, finding that more money is given to countries which might be considered 
to suffer from poor governance, and that loan financing is likely driven by commercial factors. Data used for this 
analysis is from the World Bank’s debt database on loan commitments. Quantitative studies such as these are 
extremely valuable in evaluating trends that are widely discussed. Further work in this area needs to be done, yet 
comprehensive analysis hinges on data availability and improved project-level reporting.  
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and the international community. Emerging donors are not necessarily in competition with 
the DAC model as Moises Nam and others may argue. Rather, there is room for 
cooperation, as long as the DAC recognizes the differences, and does not aim to fit all 
donors under one umbrella. 
The DAC Model 
A large handful of non-DAC donors model their emerging aid programs after the DAC, 
often reporting aid statistics to the body. They are the candidates most likely to officially 
join, following the path of South Korea that became a member on January 1, 2010. These 
are primarily countries that are members of the OECD or the European Union but not the 
DAC –the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Poland, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, and Turkey. Their aid programs and definitions of ODA generally follow the DAC 
guidelines and the amounts they give have risen significantly over the past decade. 
Figure 5: ODA from OECD non-DAC donors over time ($Millions)
 
Although some of the DAC-model countries may not have large foreign aid programs, they 
are more accustomed to participating in Western multilateral institutions. There is often little 
political hesitation to refer to the programs as “aid” or to align with traditional donors; for 
many this is actually a goal. The 12 newest members of the EU have all adhered to the 2005 
European Consensus on Development, pledging to increase net ODA to 0.17 percent of 
GNI by 2010 and 0.33 percent by 2015.26 As members of the OECD these countries have 
full observer status and can participate in the DAC meetings. Several countries, including the 
Czech Republic and Poland, have already received the DAC peer reviews. When determining 
membership, the DAC will assess size of the country’s aid program, existence of institutions, 
the quality of statistical reporting, and the implementation of the DAC recommendations. 
                                                       




















Source: OECD DAC  
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The largest barrier for these countries, apart from the size of their foreign aid programs, is 
the lack of comprehensive data collection and reporting. 
Turkey stands out among this group as it is often an emerging economy considered to be 
more “BRIC-like.” Not a new donor, Turkey’s foreign aid program began in 1985 with a 
package to aid the Sahel countries. For years it remained a net recipient of foreign aid; 
although it currently receives small and largely symbolic amounts of aid, it is a net 
contributor and gives only slightly less gross ODA than Korea. The Turkish International 
Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) was founded in 1992. 27 As with many 
countries in this group, aid is mostly targeted at neighbors and strategically important 
partners although contributions to Africa are growing. The majority (52 percent) of Turkey’s 
aid is targeted to Asia, 19 percent to the Middle East, 15 percent to Europe, and 6 percent to 
Africa.28  
We also place one of the BRICS in the DAC-like group – Russia. As a former superpower, 
Russia is now seen as a “re-emerging power” and donor.29 During the Cold War the Soviet 
Union provided some of the largest global quantities of aid – in 1986 alone it gave $26 
billion.30 Following the dissolution of the USSR, Russia became a large recipient of aid and 
has only recently re-emerged as a donor. Russia’s aid program appears to be part of an 
overall strategy to re-build the nation’s global image and influence, and there is discussion of 
creating an independent aid agency. Unlike aid from the other BRICS, Russia channels a 
large amount of its assistance through multilateral organizations including the Eurasian 
Economic Community, the World Bank, and the UN. In 2007 Russia committed to increase 
aid toward the 0.7 percent target and has aligned its program with the principles of the DAC 
donors. 31 It thus sets itself apart from the aid programs of its fellow BRICS and seems to 
align more directly with the traditional donors.  
The DAC Model countries are providing foreign assistance in a manner that mirrors the 
traditional DAC donors; characteristics and modalities of giving aid are largely similar to 
their DAC peers. The focus of assistance is often on social sectors and follows classic donor-
recipient relationships. Aid programs are recent and still fairly small, yet these countries 
strive to be seen as part of the international donor community as embodied by the DAC. 
The Arab Model 
Arab donors have some of the oldest, most established, and most generous aid programs in 
the world. It is not a new model of giving aid; rather it has consistently served as an 
alternative model to the DAC approach. Between 1973 and 2008, Arab aid averaged 13 
                                                       
27 Kulaklikaya, Musa and Rahman Nurdun.  
28 OECD DAC data, 2009. 
29 : Zimmermann and Smith, Provost. 
30 Provost, Claire. 
31 Zimmermann and Smith, 724.  
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percent of DAC ODA and almost 75 percent of non-DAC ODA. Historically Arab donors 
have given very substantial amounts of aid in relation to GNI; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the 
UAE averaged 1.5 percent of GNI between 1973 and 2008 – more than twice the UN target 
and almost five times more than the average DAC country. Although this level has fallen 
from its peak in the 1970s and early 80s, Arab donors still rank among the most generous 
DAC countries. However, their aid is characterized by volatility, and levels of aid are loosely 
correlated with oil prices and national petroleum export revenues (also this trend has been 
less apparent since the 1990s).32 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE account for more than 
90 percent of total Arab ODA.33 Qatar is one of the more recent Arab donors and it is the 
Gulf country with the highest income per capita. Yet little data or information about its 
foreign aid activities is available. 
Arab foreign aid tends to predominately flow to other Arab countries; Morocco, Oman and 
Yemen are some of the top recipients. Although the Middle East-North Africa region still 
receives almost 75 percent of Arab aid, there has been an increase in commitments over the 
past decade to low-income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.34 The Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development, which houses the Coordination Group, gives only to 
Arab countries with the stated goal of furthering economic and social development as well as 
regional integration.35  
Figure 6: Recipients of Arab Aid, 2000-2007 
 
Arab aid is distinct from the DAC model as it remains primarily concentrated regionally and 
is more openly influenced by social solidarity and religious ties. Arab solidarity, especially in 
the early years of foreign assistance, was a primary objective. For instance, Egypt was a large 
                                                       
32 “Arab Development Assistance,” 5-7. 
33 “Arab Development Assistance,” 1. 
34 “Arab Development Assistance,” 13-15. 













Source: "Arab Development Asistance" WB Report June 2010  
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recipient of Arab aid in the 1970s yet experienced significant declines in Arab aid following 
the Camp David Accords in 1978.36 One statistical study found that bilateral Arab aid is 
more likely to flow to countries that do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. 
Countries that vote with Saudi Arabia in the UN General Assembly are also more likely to 
be eligible for aid from Arab donors.37 Some scholars suggest the central role of Islam and 
religious solidarity, although others maintain that although the influence exists, it is of small 
importance.38 The Islamic Development Bank, one of the largest Arab donor agencies, does 
lend only to countries that are members of the Organization of Islamic Conference and 
provides financing compatible with Shari’ah law which prohibits the collection of interest on 
financial transactions.39 Arab donors have expanded to sub-Saharan Africa, this may be 
partially influenced by the goal of Afro-Arab unity.40 Although some DAC donors may give 
aid to support former colonies or other cultural linkages, the Arab model is unique in this 
underlying motivation for aid programs and selection of recipients. 
The relative cohesiveness and the high level of coordination between Arab donors is 
somewhat unique, and may be a result of common cultural, religious, and linguistic ties 
between Arab donors.41 For decades, countries have worked closely with each other and 
through the various Arab multilateral organizations; the Coordination Group consists of 
nine institutions – three national ones (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE) and five regional 
organizations, in addition to the Arab Gulf Program for United Nations Development 
Organizations. Aid projects are often co-financed amongst members. Commitments to the 
Arab financial institutions have quadrupled since their inception in the 1970s. Yet as a 
percentage of total Arab aid, commitment to multilateral institutions remain low in 
comparison with bilateral assistance; between 1973 and 2008 the ratio of multilateral to 
bilateral ODA was 13 percent among Arab donors, compared to the DAC average of 30 
percent. In 2009, around five percent of total Arab ODA went to multilateral institutions.42 
Arab donors are also unique in the procurement and disbursement processes; they have 
adopted common procedures as set out by the Arab Coordination Group’s Procurement 
Guidelines. 43 In contrast with other Southern donors, Arab donors require a competitive 
bidding process, which allows for local suppliers and contractors to implement projects. 44 
Sectoral priorities of both bilateral and multilateral Arab donors appear to have remained 
relatively constant over time; infrastructure projects in transport, energy, and water supply 
                                                       
36 Villanger, 18. The Camp David Accords led to the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 
1979. As a result, Egypt’s relations with the rest of the Arab world suffered. 
37 Neumayer, 13. 
38 Neumayer, 4. 
39 Villanger, 19. 
40 Neumayer, 4. 
41 Villanger, Zimmermann and Smith. 
42 DAC stats, 2009. 
43 For more information, see “The Guidelines for the Procurement of Goods and Contracting for the 
Execution of Works” 
http://www.arabfund.org/Data/site1/pdf/GUIDELINES_FOR_THE_PROCUREMENT%202001.pdf 
44 “Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum” (ECOSOC), 29.  
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have dominated the agenda.45 Aid is generally untied, and is made available with few 
conditionalities.46 
The Southern Model 
The other emerging donors--Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and Venezuela--are very 
careful to distinguish their assistance programs from the DAC donors and the traditional 
donor-recipient model. Rather, they maintain that their engagement is in the form of 
mutually beneficial relationships. Deborah Brautigam argues that Chinese aid is 
differentiated from traditional donors because the country follows “a distinctly different set 
of core ideas about development… China’s aid [has] changed, but in way that for the most 
part diverged sharply from the evolving notions of aid in the West.”47 Jonathan Glennie 
distinguishes South-South cooperation as “horizontal” – players on the same level providing 
assistance to each other. This is in comparison with the more traditional “vertical” aid where 
a donor gifts aid or expertise to recipients.48 Non-traditional aid is also called “mutual 
assistance,” largely motivated by the promotion of bilateral and regional trade and 
investment. For instance, China has pioneered a strategy of overseas export processing 
zones in African countries which it argues is mutually beneficial; Chinese officials have 
explained that special economic zones (SEZs) were the shortcut to their own development 
and they want to share that model with other countries.49 But it may also be that SEZs serve 
as attractive venues for Chinese firms looking to move their operations overseas. 
Southern donors often emphasize infrastructure, especially regional infrastructure projects, 
to ease trade routes and lower transactions costs. Resource rich African countries such as 
Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria have been popular targets and recipients of aid. As Southern 
donor countries grow, they face increasing pressure to meet internal demands for natural 
resources. Many African nations have untapped natural resources and the continent has seen 
a race to gain access to their industries.  
Southern countries often begin with small regional programs, and are increasingly expanding 
to include partners beyond their boundaries – especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Technical cooperation is often the main focus, especially in the early years of aid programs. 
   
                                                       
45 Shushan and Marcoux, 1976. 
46 Neumayer, 3.  
47 Brautigam, 24. 
48 Glennie, Jonathan, “A New Direction.” 
49 Brautigam, 74-78.  
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Table 2: Overview of Southern Donors 
COUNTRY  MODALITY  TOP RECIPIENTS  MAIN SECTORS 
Argentina  Mainly project oriented 
and technical 
cooperation. Some debt 
relief. 
Mostly Latin America 
(Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Cuba, Haiti). Extending 
to Africa (in Angola, 
Mozambique, Zambia). 
Agriculture and food security, 
maternal and child health, 
human rights. 
Brazil  Mainly technical 
cooperation and co-
financed projects. Some 
debt relief and large 
amounts of emergency 
assistance. 
Haiti, Cape Verde, East 
Timor. Other main 
focuses are Lusophone 
and Southern American 
countries. 
Mainly social sectors. Some 
involvement in agriculture, 
bio-fuels/ethanol and digital 
inclusion.  
Chile  Technical cooperation 
and scholarships. 
Cuba, Guatemala, El 
Salvador. Most aid to 
Latin America and 
Africa (about 29 % of 
total aid goes to SSA). 
International relations and 
regional integration (58%), 
modernization of state and 
decentralization (17%), social 
(13%), natural resources and 
development (10%), 
productive capacity (2%). 
Venezuela  Oil deals are essentially 
BoP support. Also some 
humanitarian assistance 
through BANDES. 
Latin America and 
Caribbean. 
Mainly energy. Also projects 
in health, education, housing, 
water, and private sector. 
China  Bilateral aid. Projects, 
in-kind, technical 
cooperation, and debt 
relief. 
Africa (46%), Asia 
(33%), Latin America 
(13%) 
Economic infrastructure 
(61%); industry (16%); energy 
and resources (9%); 
Agriculture (4%) 
India  Mostly project oriented 
and technical 
cooperation (with the 
exception of more 
general support to 





Approximately 85% to 
Asia; 15% to Africa. 
Rural development, 
education, health, technical 
cooperation. Also gives loans 
primarily for infrastructure.  
South Africa  Majority through 
multilaterals channels 
(esp. NEPAD, African 
Renaissance Fund). 
Some debt relief. 
Southern African 
Development 
Community (70%) and 
other African countries. 
Much work through 
peacekeeping, post-conflict 
reconstruction, technical 
cooperation. Beginning to get 
involved with infrastructure. 
Sources: “Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum” (ECOSOC), 
Kragelund (2011), China White Paper on Foreign Aid, Braude et al.   
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Partners Not Recipients 
Foreign assistance and Southern cooperation is also a tool to increase leverage both 
regionally and internationally. The key Southern donors tend to be regional superpowers – 
China, India, Brazil, South Africa – and are increasingly seen by the international community 
as representatives for their neighbors in the global arena. For instance, Thabo Mbeki in 1999 
aimed to make South Africa the leading power on the continent thus he chaired the African 
Union, created the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and coined the 
“African Renaissance.” By expanding the country’s influence, culturally, economically, and 
through regional governing bodies, South Africa has indeed emerged as the leader in 
development on the continent. The same story holds true for other Southern donors. 
Yet assistance programs are also used as a tool to increase leverage within the international 
community, and have been for half a decade. The Non-Aligned Movement and G77 arose to 
counter the bipolar world of the Cold War and to provide a collective voice for the South. 
Southern countries continue to share a belief in gaining stronger representation in the 
international community. Foreign aid programs can be used as a tool to win friends and gain 
votes in an international forum such as the UN. Both India and Brazil maintain that 
development aid is a tool to get political leverage at the UN, namely a seat on the UN 
Security Council. They use high level summits along with strategic partnerships such as the 
India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) to amplify positions on global issues by 
uniting their voice. As one Indian academic said “We need Africa not only for oil but for 
political power too…. but we do not have the money of the Chinese or the military might of 
the Americans. Therefore we have to rely on cooperating with African nations… where we 
have something to give.”50 With the exception of China (which has a strong voice on its 
own), Southern donors have begun to work together to claim a louder, unified voice for 
Southern representation.  
In negotiations over Tibet in 1954, China’s premier Zhou Enlai presented the “Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:” (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity (2) mutual non-aggression (3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs (4) 
equality and mutual benefit and (5) peaceful coexistence.51 Half a century later, Chinese 
officials still point to these principles as the foundation for their foreign policy and aid 
programs. It is also the mantra for most other Southern players. “Equality and mutual 
benefit” is reflected in the insistence that countries are not “donors,” but “development 
partners.” China and some of the other large emerging donors believe strongly in mutually 
beneficial relationships, rather than the traditional Western “donor-recipient” relationship.52 
Many of the emerging donors have had their own experiences with colonialism and Western 
involvement; they are very insistent that their relationship with other developing countries is 
                                                       
50 Ajay Dubey quoted in The Guardian April 2008. Source Shaw et al. 
51 Brautigam, 30. 
52 Multiple sources: Brautigam, Kragelund, Rowlands, Zimmermann and Smith.  
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a partnership, rather than a new form of colonialism. Former President Festus Mogae of 
Botswana expressed the sentiment of many Africans in describing the Chinese, for example, 
when he said “I find that the Chinese treat us as equals. The West treats us as former 
subjects.”53  
This approach leads Southern donors to approach developing countries as business partners, 
rather than as subjects or recipients of targeted donations. Traditional Western donors have 
shifted to focus on social sectors and poverty reduction—social sector spending including 
education, health, and governance accounts for roughly 60 percent of the DAC sector-based 
ODA.54. Many Southern donors, on the other hand, tend to look at productive sectors, with 
a focus on lowering transaction costs and supply side constraints, rather than focusing on 
social programs such as health and education. 55 Technical cooperation and training has 
historically been a focus of many Southern partners, and remains the main channel of 
assistance for smaller contributors. 
Differences and Tensions in Delivering Aid 
The principle of “non-interference” is a defining aspect of Southern development 
cooperation; some Western critics have argued that China is bankrolling “rouge states.” The 
principle of non-interference can be traced back to the Bandung Conference– the Final 
Communiqué included the agreement to adhere to the following principles: (1) respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, (2) abstention from intervention or 
interference in the internal affairs of another country and (3) abstention by any country from 
exerting pressures on any other country. Southern nations have their own experiences with 
colonialism and economic sanctions, which helps to explain their resistance to apply political 
and economic conditionalities. Non-interference may also be a convenient rationale for 
doing business in countries that are unappealing to Western donors. But Southern donors 
are not bankrolling “rogue states;” it is worth noting that the largest beneficiaries of 
Southern assistance are also top recipients of aid from the DAC, with the exception of 
Burma.56  
As an aspect of their non-interference policy, Southern donors traditionally do not apply 
conditionality on their aid. (With the exception of China’s “One-China” policy which 
prohibits official relations with the Republic of China -Taiwan). This is in stark contrast with 
northern donors and international financial institutions that have are known for requiring 
                                                       
53 Quoted in Paulo and Reisen. There is still criticism, however, about China’s operations in Africa. 
Increasingly skeptics across Africa are raising concerns about the sustainability and construction of infrastructure 
projects, along with poor working conditions in Chinese-run mines and businesses.
 (The Economist, “The Chinese 
in Africa”) The recently-elected president Michael “King Cobra” Sata of Zambia has run on anti-China 
platforms.
 (Conway-Smith, Erin, “Zambian election results check Chinese Influence in Africa,” The Global Post) 
54 OECD DAC, 2009 data. 
55 Kragelund (2011), 603. 
56 “Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum” (ECOSOC), 20.  
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specific changes to governance and macroeconomic policies in recipient countries. In recent 
years, traditional DAC donors have moved away from macroeconomic and political 
conditionalities to a certain degree, yet still include safeguards and require conformity to 
labor and environmental standards. Non-DAC donors generally have fewer requirements to 
meet. This enables more rapid disbursement compared to an often-prolonged DAC process. 
Southern donors also tend to focus primarily on project assistance, rather than general 
budget support. 57  
Although there may not be policy conditionalities, mutual assistance means that the majority 
of aid from Southern countries, especially China, India, and Venezuela, is tied. 58 This aid 
may be tied to the use of donor-country contractors and companies, donor-country goods, 
or oil imports. China, for instance, will finance its own companies to directly implement 
projects, rather than directing funds to host government accounts.59 This is not uncommon; 
many traditional donors also give tied aid, despite an official policy of untying (with the 
exception of emergency assistance). Of the DAC donors: 64 percent of South Korea’s aid is 
tied, 45 percent of Greece’s aid, and 23 percent of the United States’ aid is tied.60  
Most aid from Southern donors comes from a variety of channels within the government, 
leading to the difficulties in measurement and reporting standards. In China there is no 
separate department in charge of foreign assistance; one estimate is that there are between 15 
and 23 agencies in China that play some role in their development aid.61  
Figure 7: Estimation of China’s Aid and Official Financing Decision Making 
Structure 
 
Source: Christensen, 2010 
                                                       
57 “Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum” (ECOSOC), 21-22. 
58 “Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum” (ECOSOC), 30. 
59 Brautigam, 82; 152. 
60 Commitment to Development Index, 2010. 
61 “Emerging Donors,” ONE Data Report.  
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India’s assistance is also delivered through a myriad of aid channels. A plan for an external 
aid agency was quietly buried in 2010 as no single department wanted to give up its powers 
and a consensus could not be reached.62 The creation of an autonomous aid agency also 
tends to mean that the nation is branded an “official donor,” which some Southern donors 
prefer to avoid. There are several countries that do have aid agencies; Brazil has the Brazilian 
Cooperation Agency (ABC), and South Africa announced in 2011 the creation of the South 
African Development Partnership Agency. These agencies, however, are often tucked away 
in the foreign ministries with little control over policy or budget matters. Brazil’s ABC is 
divided into seven units, run by diplomats whose assignments change every few years, 
leaving no continuity and a lack of political clout.63 Expertise gaps along with monitoring 
and evaluation tend to hamper ABC’s operations.64 Many Southern donors, including South 
Korea, a recent member of the DAC, have a dual aid system; the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs often control grants and technical assistance programs, while Export-Import banks 
manage loans. This is not to say that aid from DAC countries is coordinated in one agency 
either; the United States for instance gives aid through at least 26 different channels. 65 
Nonetheless, it is challenging for new donors to get a handle on the various streams of aid 
flows from different agencies of government. 
The channels through which Southern donors direct their foreign assistance also vary. China 
and India tend to give the majority of aid through direct bilateral relationships. China 
especially tends to be less collaborative with other Southern donors for fear of losing policy 
independence.66 There is more hesitation to give to multilateral organizations as that is 
branded official aid and presumably there is reluctance to fall under the leadership of 
Western dominated institutions, such as the IMF or World Bank. South Africa and Brazil, on 
the other hand, are increasingly open to collaboration with each other and with multilateral 
organizations. South Africa actually channels more than 75 percent of their aid through 
multilateral organizations, especially Southern African bodies.67 There is an increasing 
movement to channel these funds through Southern development organizations rather than 
relying on traditional western institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. IBSA proves to 
be a strong platform for uniting development assistance from India, Brazil, and South 
Africa. Venezuela historically channeled aid through the international financial institutions. 
Yet in the past five years there has been a switch to promote Latin American institutions, 
specifically Banco del Sur. Chavez even envisions Banco del Sur replacing the role of the 
World Bank and IMF on the continent.68 This regional model is more similar to the co-
ordination of the Arab model, rather than the traditional DAC approach.  
                                                       
62 Mitra, Devirupa and Roy, Shubhajit. 
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64 Cabral and Weinstock 8-9 
65 Although all have official aid agencies, independent or not.  
66 Rowlands, 2. 
67“Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum” (ECOSOC), 25. 
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Triangular Cooperation 
A recent form of cooperation that has yet to appear prominently on the global scale is 
Triangular Development Cooperation. The most common form is North-South-South 
where a traditional (North) and a non-traditional (South) donor work together with a 
beneficiary (South) to run an aid program. The rationale is that non-traditional donors that 
have managed to create successful economic development at home have more appropriate 
technical expertise that can be combined with financing and approaches from traditional 
donors. A good example is the Africa-Brazil Cooperation Program on Social Protection, a 
partnership between the Ministry of Social Development in Brazil, the Department for 
International Development in the United Kingdom, and the International Poverty Center, a 
program of the UN Development Program and Brazilian government. It is designed to use 
Brazil’s technical expertise on social protection programs including conditional cash 
transfers to ensure that children are vaccinated and attend school (Bolsa Familia). Traditional 
donors that have been engaged or interested in triangular cooperation are mainly Japan, 
Germany, Spain, and Canada, along with some multilateral institutions including the UN. 
Most non-traditional donors have been involved in some North-South cooperation, with the 
exception of Arab nations. The scale of their cooperation is difficult to determine as neither 
non-traditional nor traditional donors report separately on cooperation projects. Triangular 
cooperation programs so far have consisted mainly of technical cooperation and dispersed 
small projects. It is an approach to aid that is not researched or implemented to its fullest 
extent, however is supported in theory by both sets of donors. The Paris Declaration and 
Accra Agenda for Action encourage increased collaboration with all development actors and 
specifically support further development of triangular cooperation. 
Is DAC Still Relevant? 
With three distinct models for development, what are the implications for the traditional 
donors in the DAC? The first group of EU and OECD donors will most likely merge with 
the DAC in the near future. Yet what about the Arab and Southern models? Is the DAC an 
organization and model that is relevant for them?  
Zimmermann and Smith (2011) discuss ways in which the emerging donors may converge 
towards the DAC reporting standards (or a broader definition of official financial flows) and 
the institutional channels through which this might occur. But we believe that it is unlikely 
that the Arab model will merge with the DAC model and that Arab donors will join the 
DAC. In recent years Arab donors have become more active in collaborating with Western 
institutions and have partnered with the World Bank, DAC members, AfDB, and EBRD, 
among others. There are increasing opportunities for co-financed projects, advisory 
assistance, and broad-level discussions. Yet the Arab model remains very much a parallel 
structure; they have also established coordination mechanisms amongst themselves. They 
have not merged with the DAC for the past forty years, and there is little reason to believe  
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they will in the future. There is a lack of incentive to officially join the DAC, which could 
perhaps learn from the Arab donors about coordination, harmonization, and consultation.  
As is true for Arab donors, the Southern countries also lack an incentive to join the DAC. 
Although they may be signatories to the Paris Declaration (as recipients), there are 
fundamental differences in the mentality of approaching aid between the DAC and Southern 
models. By joining the DAC, Southern partners would essentially give up their approach as a 
development partner and join the ranks of official donors, potentially harming the 
relationship with many recipient countries which often see them as a welcome alternative to 
Western donors.  
Experts may argue about whether or not the DAC represents anything more than a forum 
for meetings in Europe. Yet membership in the DAC often means that countries can brand 
themselves as donors in the international community. Southern donors would likely lose a 
significant amount of soft power in developing countries if they are seen to be “selling out” 
to the West. In addition they would lose a fair amount of business and projects in the 
developing world if they fully ascribed to the DAC principles rather than their traditional 
allegiance to non-interference and other principles of the Non-Aligned Movement. This 
would require compromising principles from the Bandung Conference, the Non-Aligned 
Movement and the Five Principles Approach that most of these countries have held as a 
central tenant of their foreign aid strategies.  
Joining the DAC would also complicate domestic politics for many Southern countries 
which have high levels of poverty at home. It might constrain the flows of aid they are able 
to receive from Western donors. It would also prove difficult to explain to domestic 
constituents; as Brautigam explains, aid from China, for instance, is still a very sensitive issue 
domestically and many details are kept secret.69  
In sum, the direct benefits of joining the DAC for Southern countries may be scarce. 
Countries would be recognized by the international community as donors, yet becoming a 
member of the OECD and DAC might not do much to increase their voice in the 
international arena. It is highly unlikely that members of the Arab and Southern models will 
officially join the DAC or choose to implement the DAC style of providing foreign 
assistance in the near future.  
Can New Donors Be Persuaded to Increase Transparency? 
Rather than aiming to gain new DAC members and work the non-DAC donors into the 
traditional model, the international donor community should focus on increasing the level of 
reporting, tolerating a variety of channels and languages through which this may occur. Every donor 
needs to be encouraged to compile credible data on amounts of loan and grant 
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disbursements, multilateral versus bilateral commitments, types of assistance, region, and 
sector. Currently, there is very scarce reporting on project evaluation and impact 
assessments. This absence is one of the reasons that claims such as this are made: “Chinese 
Vice Minister of Commerce Fu Ziying said… that China has not found a single case of 
corruption in its aid projects to foreign countries during the past six decades.”70 
More than data aggregates, what is needed is project-level data. Even Arab countries that 
report flows to the DAC do not submit country or project level data. The only way to 
improve collaboration is to ensure that all actors can operate in an information-rich 
environment. Project level data is also the only way to ensure accountability and would allow 
civil society to more actively monitor government activities. All donors, including the 
members of the DAC, should increase reporting on triangular cooperation. We cannot 
expect to improve collaboration in a system where we cannot quantify the amount of aid 
flows – where we do not know if non-DAC countries are giving 8 percent or 31 percent of 
global gross ODA.  
Changing the International Forum for Aid Discussions 
Discussions about non-traditional donors are increasingly taking center stage in meetings 
about aid and aid effectiveness. The DAC is actively attempting to engage non-DAC donors; 
it has invited representatives from Southern countries to participate in Senior Level meetings 
and is initiating dialogue through programs such as the China-DAC Study Group. The 
Working Party on Aid Effectiveness is a start and increasingly has fostered dialogue since 
inception in 2003. The Task Team on South-South Co-operation is another effort with the 
goal of providing recommendations to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
in Busan, Korea at the end of 2011. 71  
The problem is that these groups and studies are all taken under the OECD-DAC umbrella. 
The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness is a forum within the OECD-DAC, hosted by 
DAC and described on its website. The Working Party has organized the High Level 
Meetings on Aid Effectiveness in 2003 (Rome), 2005 (Paris), 2008 (Accra), and 2011 
(Busan). Non-DAC participants are included, yet it is not really an independent forum for 
the discussion of international aid cooperation and understanding. It is an OECD-DAC 
forum. Southern and Arab donors will likely not fully ascribe to a donor dialogue that is led 
by the DAC.  
The international aid community needs a more independent forum for these discussions. 
The DAC should be a donor caucus within this body, not the other way around. A more 
independent platform would allow equal space for the DAC, the Arab, and the Southern 
models, without trying to fit all three under the DAC umbrella.  
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The United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) has the potential to become 
this independent body. The DCF was mandated by the 2005 World Summit and had the first 
biennial meeting in July 2008.72 Hosted by the UN, it is a more neutral forum than the 
OECD-DAC and brings together not only member states, but development-related UN 
bodies and civil society organizations. But it has not yet risen to the challenge and remains 
largely overshadowed by the DAC’s Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and High Level 
Forums.  
The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) is also a more neutral platform in the 
early stages of development, where the DAC countries are only one piece in the larger 
international aid arena.73 Launched in 2008 at the Accra High Level Forum, IATI is network 
of organizations that has agreed upon data standards; it is not a database but an initiative to 
publish and categorize info in a timely manner. It is designed to complement DAC’s 
Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database, and is open to private foundations and NGOs as 
well. IATI aims to report project level information, including documentation about project 
objectives and monitoring of results. Although governed independently, IATI is still tied to 
the follow-up process of Accra led by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. With 
improved independence it could attract non-DAC donors. It aims to have information and 
reporting available in languages and formats that both governments and citizens can be 
comfortable with. IATI does need to strengthen incentives for endorsement and reporting; 
currently 22 partner countries have endorsed the initiative.  
Beyond the scope of this paper (but discussed in other CGD work) is the issue of global 
governance (Rueda-Sabater, Ramachandran and Kraft, 2009). It is hard to imagine a higher 
level of cooperation across countries without fundamental changes to global governance that 
will give emerging economies fair representation in the Bretton Woods and other global 
institutions. While Belgium has 103 votes per billion dollars of GDP at the IMF, China has 
about 25. Countries like India, Turkey, Brazil and Russia also feel sidelined in the multilateral 
institutions. Efforts to address this inequity have at best been marginal. Many emerging 
donors are trying to build their profile in the international arena and gain influence on both a 
regional and global level. Allowing Southern countries to gain more representation might 
improve incentives for non-DAC countries to participate in international aid cooperation 
initiatives.  
Conclusion 
Traditional donors and institutions are currently making every effort possible to coax 
emerging donors to join the fold. Working groups hosted by OECD-DAC aim to increase 
dialogue and encourage new donors to report data according to the DAC’s standards. 
Individual large donors are also making efforts to welcome the newcomers, including 
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through the triangular cooperation mechanisms discussed above. We do not yet know the 
outcome of these efforts but it does appear that some countries are on different paths and 
are determined to stay the course.  
In order to fully engage new donors, it needs to be recognized that they will likely not simply 
merge with the OECD-DAC. There is scope for aid coordination on a global level, yet it 
probably needs to move away from the OECD-DAC umbrella. The UN-DCF and IATI 
both have the potential to engage all donors, yet these are relatively new institutions and 
must overcome some challenges to take center stage.  
Finally, encouraging aid transparency must be the core focus of the aid community, 
especially reporting data on project level assistance. These data are the crucial step in fully 
understanding the similarities and differences between traditional and non-traditional 
donors. Aid transparency is critical to improving the delivery of foreign assistance, to meet 
the goals of poverty reduction and economic development. 
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